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G.: Evidence--Hearsay--Declarations Against Penal Interest Not Allowe
CASE COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-HEAAY-DECLARATIONS

AGANST PENAL INTEREsT

NOT ALLowvD.-Action by the plaintiff, a former sheriff, for the
recovery of damages arising from an alleged libelous publication
concerning him printed in the defendant newspaper. The publication was a letter written to the editor by a third person containing
statements that the author's brother, now deceased, had paid protection money to the sheriff for immunity from arrest and prosecution for illegally selling liquor. The trial court permitted a number
of witnesses to testify as to declarations made to them by the deceased. Held, reversing the lower court, that testimony of witnesses
as to alleged conversations with the deceased brother were inadmissible as hearsay. McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 282 S.C. 448,
102 S.E.2d 750 (1958).
Hearsay as defined by Professor Wigmore is "that rule which
prohibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony
of the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court
on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to
the grounds of his assertion and of his qualifications to make it."
5 WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 1346 (3d ed. 1940). Other reasons which
have been advanced to support its exclusion from evidence are the
fact that the court and jury are unable to test its creditability by
observing the demeanor of the person who made the statement
and the declarant is not under a responsibility to answer for the
crime of perjury in making a willful falsification. Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Cooper Corp. v. Jeffcoat, 217 S.C. 489,
61 S.E.2d 53 (1950). The purpose of this rule is to prevent testimony of an untrustworthy nature from being entered into evidence.
In pursuit of this purpose the courts have not excluded all hearsay evidence but have established exceptions to this rule when they
have been able to find declarations made under circumstances which
would greatly bolster their trustworthiness, particularly where these
are the only available modes of proof. Donnelly v. United States,
supra; Roe v. Journegan, 175 N.C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918).
The court in the principal case was concerned with the exception of declarations against interest. This exception recognizes that
men will not make statements prejudicial to their own interest unless
the statements are true. Coupled with this adverse interest restriction are the requirements that the declarant be unavailable and that
no motive for falsification be shown. Under these circumstances the
courts will admit declarations although the sanction of an oath and
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the test of cross-examination are wanting. Clark & Jones v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Smith
v. Moore, 142 N.C. 277, 55 S.E. 275 (1906).
As stated by Jefferson, DeclarationsAgainst Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Hav. L. BEv. 1, 39 (1944), "On
principle, the exception for declarations against interest would admit
declarations contrary to any kind of interest of sufficient importance
to a declarant to promote his telling the truth", but this is certainly
not the rule in this country as exemplified by the many decisions
limiting the exception to declarations against interest of a pecuniary
or proprietary nature. See, Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175
Iowa 858, 151 N.W. 852 (1915); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179
Okla. 617. 67 P.2d 452 (1937).
Despite the fact that no logical or sound reason exists for their
elimination the great majority of jurisdictions do not recognize penal
or social interest as included in this exception. The precedent for
this exclusion is said to be the Sussex Peerage case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85,
8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844), which one author has described as "nothing short of sheer nonsense," Comment, 20 Rocxy MT. L. Rgv. 97
(1947), and another as "utterly ridiculous." Jefferson, supra at 40.
The above rule has been criticized by many of the text writers, particularly by WiGmomE, EvmNF.c § 1476, and McCoim~cx, EVIENC
§ 255 (1954). The rule was also criticized in a dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Donnelly v. United States, supra.
A few progressive courts have relaxed the rule of exclusions of
declarations against penal interest in particular situations. See,
People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952); Cameron
v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 374, 217 S.W.2d 23 (1949); Brennan v..
State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Aft. 148 (1926). A few others have directly
overruled it. See, Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61
S.E.2d 318 (1950); In re Forsythe's Estate, 221 Minn. 303, 22
N.W.2d 19 (1946); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284
(1945); Hines v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
Other courts recognizing that most criminal offenses may also

involve tort liability for the same acts have permitted the declarations to come in as declarations against pecuniary interest. See,
Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., supra; Aetna Life Ins. Co. V.
Strauch, supra. The form may be lacking but the substance is
present and if the orthodox rule were applied by all courts in this
manner it would do little harm "for almost every crime against the
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person or property of another creates a liability in tort." Morgan,
DeclarationsAgainst Interest, 5 VAND.L. REV. 451, 475 (1952). The
South Carolina court made no mention of this possibility in the
principal case.

The

MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE rule 509 (1942), and the UNIRU=E OF EVIDENCE 68(10), have taken still another approach
and urge that declarations against any of the four interests, pecuniary, proprietary, penal, and social, should be tested by the trial
court using a reasonable man test, i.e., would a reasonable man in
the declarant's position have made such a statement if he did not
believe it to be true?
FORM

It is submitted that the courts in following precedent have
overlooked the very purpose for which this exception was brought
into existence-to admit into evidence declarations made under circumstances inducive of trustworthiness. If the courts will admit a
statement by a declarant that he owes a $25.00 debt on the basis
that he would not have made such a statement unless it were true
would it not be more reasonable to assume that a man would not
confess to the crime of murder, of much more concern and involving
more serious consequences, unless it were also not true?
The judicial decisions in this area are so firmly established
that most states will require legislative help to expand the rule to
its proper bounds.
G. D. G.

LiABmrry INSURANcE-BREACH OF CO-OPERATION CLAUsE-FAILTo TEsTxn.-Plaintiff brought suit to recover for

URE OF INSURED

injuries sustained while riding as a passenger in Brown's automobile.
Brown was insured against personal liability by the defendant, the
policy providing that Brown should co-operate with the defendant
in securing and giving evidence. Brown gave the defendant a
written statement of the details of the accident. Before the trial
Brown informed the defendant insurer that he could no longer recall the circumstances of the accident due to traumatic amnesia, and
that the written statement he had prepared earlier was based on
information given him by other persons involved in the accident.
Held, Brown had not violated the co-operation provision of the
policy so as to relieve the defendant from liability. Brown v. State
Farm Mutual life Ins. Co., 104 S.E.2d 673 (S.C. 1958).
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